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Abstract  
This thesis studies the relationship of income tax progressivity and output volatility. 
Using our dataset of 31 OECD countries and Bayesian model averaging (BMA) 
approach to address the model uncertainty issue, we find positive evidence that 
higher income tax progressivity leads to lower output volatility. This effect is robust 
to different prior specifications in BMA and to different tax progressivity measures, 
including our newly constructed measure which is based on the slope of the average 
tax curve. We also find a strong effect of tax progressivity on the consumption 
volatility and the volatility of hours worked which we see as the main channels for 
the reducing effect of tax progressivity on output volatility.  
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Abstrakt  
Tato práce studuje vztah mezi daňovou progresí příjmů a volatilitou HDP. Analýzou 
našeho datasetu zahrnujícího 31 OECD států a za použití metody Bayesovského 
průměrování modelů (BMA) jsme ukázali, že vyšší progresivita daně z příjmů vede 
k nižší volatilitě HDP. Tento efekt je robustní k použití různých specifikací BMA a 
zároveň k různým způsobům měření daňové progrese. Pro tuto práci jsme použili 
nový způsob poměřovaní daňové progrese, který je založen na měření sklonu křivky 
průměrné daně. Dále jsme prokázali stabilizační efekt daňové progrese na volatilitu 
spotřeby a také na volatilitu odpracovaných hodin, které pokládáme za hlavní kanály 
pro stabilizační efekt daňové progrese na volatilitu HDP. 
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Proposed Topic: 
The role of income tax progressivity in GDP smoothening : Empirical analysis  
Motivation: 
   One of the main goals of political representation is to avoid high volatility of GDP and 
ensure long-term smooth growth of the economy. Proper fiscal policy might offer few 
automatic stabiliser of the business cycle fluctuations. Such stabiliser is and countercyclical 
tool that works automatically and immediately (unemployment benefits). For example, it has 
been shown that the size of the government is negatively correlated with GDP fluctuations 
(Fatas, A., Mihov, I., 2001) an therefore serves as a good automatic stabiliser. However, the 
evidence is not strong in case of tax progressivity, even though it behaves counter cyclically, 
as well. Let’s suppose the income tax is progressive. Than the tax liabilities decreases by 
higher proportion than the taxable income, during the economic down-turn, leaving free 
resources in the economy. Vice-versa the tax liabilities grow faster, than taxable income if 
the economy is growing resulting in less volatile GDP (Attinasi, M. G. et al., 2011). The 
progressive income tax leaves more resources to the households at the expanse of the 
government in the slowdown and vice versa. The question should not be just if the tax 
progressivity works as an automatic stabiliser, but also how and through which channels. As 
the consumption of households is more sensitive to changes in disposable income than 
government expenditures, I believe the most significant (negative) correlation is between the 
volatility of consumption and tax progressivity. It will be also interesting to analyse this 
stabilisation effect for different group of countries such as: developing x developed or 
European (continental) x Anglo Saxon countries. 
Hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis #1: There is a significant correlation between tax progressivity and GDP 
volatility 
2. Hypothesis #2: If we decompose the GDP the correlation is the most significant 
between tax progressivity and consumption volatility. 
3. Hypothesis #3: The effect of automatic stabilisation of tax progressivity is higher and 
more significant in developed European countries. 
Methodology: 
To conduct this research I first need to find a proper measure of tax progressivity. Attinasi, 
M. G. et al., (2011) uses index of progressivity based on the ratio of marginal tax rate and 
average tax rate of average production worker. This offers only limited description of 
progressivity so I will also rely on forthcoming Plato index developed by A. Cobham, E.V.K. 
FitzGerald and P. Janský and defined as the ratio of non-corporate direct tax paid to the 
gross income of top quintile households (direct tax includes social security payments). I will 
than evaluate the differences in results of individual measures. The data on GDP, 
consumption, government expenditures and investments will be searched at the World bank 
  xi 
 
databases, which offers these data for many developed and developing countries for few 
decades. I expect to collect panel dataset including newest data for 2014. The final data set 
will be examined by standard econometric models as pooled OLS, fixed effect, random effect 
as well as assessing simple correlations. Based on the results I will also employ some 
grouping of individual years.  As the dependent variable I will not use only the GDP volatility, 
but also consumption volatility, investments volatility and government expenditure volatility. 
Such decomposition of GDP volatility will allow me to better explain the GDP smoothening.  
Expected Contribution: 
Moldovan, R. (2010) studies the role of taxes as automatic stabiliser in context of 
neoclassical model with monopolistic competition, however, the empirical analysis of real 
data is still needed.  To my knowledge Attinasi, M. G. et al., (2011) is the only paper 
empirically assessing the role of tax progressivity on GDP volatility, using real 
macroeconomic data. In previous works, the statement that progressivity of income taxes 
might behave as automatic stabiliser was somehow minor and not very well explained or 
studied. My contribution will be in employing another robust measure of tax progressivity, the 
Plato index, collecting new data (including years of financial crisis) for larger, not only OECD, 
number of countries. This new dataset will offer another results that will be compared to 
existing results from Attinasi, M. G. et al., (2011).  Further, I will decompose the GDP 
volatility, so my thesis should offer better understanding of the role of tax progressivity in 
GDP smoothening.  I am also going to compare the magnitudes of the studied effect for 
different groups of countries (i.e. developing x developed, continental Europe x Anglo Saxon 
countries). The recent data will allow to study the potential shift of the relationship after the 
crisis. This should shed some more light on the problematic. 
Outline: 
1. Introduction – motivation and overview of the paper 
2. Literature review – I will present recent research in this field and its characteristics 
3. Theoretical background – description of relevant theory 
4. Data – data sources and descriptive statistics 
5. Methodology – Presentation and justification of models and methods used in the 
paper 
6. Results and robustness checks 
7. Conclusion  
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1 Introduction  
One of the main goals of political representation is to ensure long-term growth and 
avoid high volatility in macroeconomic variables. Highly volatile economies usually 
experience more severe downturns when shock occurs and it is also difficult to make 
good medium to long-term decisions in volatile environment. While Easterly (2005) 
argues that macroeconomic policy does not matter for the economic development 
once the impact of intuitions is accounted for, a proper fiscal policy may provide 
automatic stabilisers which insulate the economy, to certain extent, from shocks to 
aggregate demand and this way decrease the volatility of output. Although automatic 
stabilisers are proposed as an explanation of the well-known stylized fact documented 
by Galí (1994) or Fatás and Mihov (2001) that larger governments are associated 
with lower output volatility, less attention was given to specific fiscal policies which 
may boost the automatic stabilization, such as unemployment benefits or other 
transfers. 
Attinasi et al. (2011) point out that if the tax schedule is progressive it acts as an 
automatic stabiliser and reduces the volatility of disposable income and hence the 
consumption volatility and output volatility, for which they also provide empirical 
evidence. They also found stabilizing effect of tax progressivity on the investment 
volatility, while the effect on volatility of hours worked, found by Mattesini and 
Rossi (2012), is not present in their dataset. 
This thesis aims to shed some more light on the role of tax progressivity as an 
automatic stabiliser, building on the work of Attinasi et al. (2011). Our contribution is 
then twofold: first, we construct a new measure of personal income tax progressivity 
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based on the slope of the average tax curve. And second, this is the first empirical 
study of the effect of tax progressivity on output volatility using a Bayesian model 
averaging (BMA) approach, which allows us to employ more control variables and 
provide further evidence on this topic. Our hypothesis is that the output smoothening 
effect of tax progressivity is robust to the chosen estimation technique and also to 
different progressivity measures. Secondly, we believe the effect works through 
reducing consumption volatility and hours worked volatility and therefore higher tax 
progressivity mitigates the response of economy to aggregate demand shocks and 
also to productivity shocks. 
The thesis is organised as follows: chapter 2 provides literature review focusing on 
several different aspects of the topic, chapter 3 describes the BMA technique with 
emphasis on understanding of different priors used in our empirical analysis, 
followed by chapter 4 describing our dataset of 31 OECD countries and including 
section on newly constructed measure of income tax progressivity. Chapter 5 
provides main results of our analysis including some robustness checks, while 
chapter 6 concludes. 
Literature review  3 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 What are automatic stabilisers?  
The concept of automatic stabilisers was first formulated by Musgrave and Miller 
(1948) who define them as built in flexibility of tax-transfer system that ensures fall 
in tax revenues and increase in transfers during the recessions. According to the 
above definition, automatic stabilisers exhibit two main features. First, they follow 
the business cycle, and second, they start working immediately (automatically) 
without any time lag of implementation. The second feature distinguishes automatic 
stabilisers from discretionary policies that are dependent on political decisions and 
thus suffer from the lag of implementation. Moreover, discretionary policies have 
been used for pure electoral purposes in past (Sapir and Sekkat, 2002). Traditional 
automatic stabiliser discussed in the literature are unemployment benefits, see for 
example Gruber (1994). Unemployment increases during the recession so the 
government spends more on the benefits for unemployed helping them to smooth 
their income. According to Keynesian theory higher disposable income converts to 
higher consumption dampening the fall of GDP during the recession. This is in 
contrast with Ricardian equivalence stressing the irrelevance of timing of taxes 
because for given spending, the taxes will have to be paid sooner or later. 
On the revenues side researchers have focused on overall revenues rather than 
inspecting various types of taxes. The exception is the work of Buettner and Fuest 
(2010) who found that corporate income tax helps to smooth the demand, and 
possibly the GDP, in Germany. Tax revenues are used to measure the size of 
government and its negative correlation with GDP volatility is well documented. Galí 
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(1994) shows that standard real business cycle model fails to account for this type of 
correlation that he finds in his OECD data set. The marginal destabilizing effect of 
tax revenues (total tax revenues/GDP) predicted by the model is in strong contrast 
with significant results of his empirical analysis suggesting stabilizing role of 
government size. Fatás and Mihov (2000, 2001) pointed out that Galí's (1994) model 
overlooks some important aspects of fiscal policy such as tax progressivity or 
countercyclical transfers - unemployment benefits. They provide further evidence of 
negative correlation between government size and business cycle fluctuations based 
on data from 20 OECD countries. Their results suggest that the correlation is not 
simply due to the stable level of government expenditures, because the negative 
correlation is present even for private GDP. However, they failed to identify the 
channel through which the government size smoothen the business cycle.  
Buti et al. (2002) described one of possible pitfalls of automatic stabilization - the 
negative supply side effect. They argue that mechanisms of automatic fiscal 
stabilization usually allow economic agents to delay their adjustments to changes in 
economic conditions. For example, strong social security system makes workers less 
concerned with the possibility of being unemployed and thus rises the wage demands. 
As a consequence, the labour market is less flexible and the negative supply effect 
prevails in the economy at costs of economic efficiency.  
2.2 Link between tax progressivity and automatic 
stabilisers 
One of the built-in features of tax system that influence the link between disposable 
income and actual GDP is tax progressivity. If the tax system is progressive, tax 
liabilities decrease by higher proportion than taxable income during the economic 
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down-turn, leaving free resources in the economy. Vice-versa the tax liabilities grow 
faster than taxable income if the economy is growing, resulting in less volatile 
disposable income (Attinasi et al., 2011). In another words, progressive income tax 
leaves more resources to the households at the expanse of the government in the 
slowdown and vice versa. Agell and Dillén (1994) complement Keynesian fixed price 
models by model with price-setting agents accounting for small menu-costs and price 
stickiness. In their model of monopolistic competition the progressive tax works as an 
automatic stabiliser because it affects the pricing mechanism. According to Agell and 
Dillén (1994) the progressive tax increases the steepness of marginal cost curve 
enhancing the price flexibility and resulting in lower output volatility in response to 
shifts in marginal revenue curve. On the other hand, Mattesini and Rossi (2012) 
ascribe the stabilizing effect of tax progression to the labour market. According to 
their results, the volatility of hours worked decreases as tax progressivity increases 
and consequently mitigates the response of output to external shocks. The intuition 
behind these results is rather simple: suppose a positive (negative) productivity 
shock, the output increases (decreases) as well as the marginal tax rate stimulating the 
workers to supply less (more) hours. Consequently the increase (decrease) of output 
is partly mitigated. Moldovan (2010) provides further evidence that progressive tax 
system may smooth out the business cycle by impacting the after tax income and 
therefore the consumption and hours worked via the substitution and wealth effect. 
The results suggest that while consumption, investments and consequently also the 
output are stabilized via this effect, the effect on volatility of hours worked is 
ambiguous. Moreover, he shows that the effect is stronger in monopolistic 
competition than in perfect competition. 
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All together four main channels how automatic stabilisers may operate were 
identified in the previous literature and summarized by McKay and Reis (2013). 
These are (i) the dominant disposable income effect as presented above (see Brown, 
1955 for more) (ii) marginal incentives (Christiano, 1984), i.e. increase of effective 
tax rate in years of growth and decrease in slowdowns encouraging intertemporal 
substitution of work effort away from booms (iii) redistribution channel proposed by 
Blinder (1975) suggesting that redistribution may shift the wealth to individuals with 
higher propensity to consume and hence boost the aggregate demand and 
consumption and (iv) social insurance channel: policies aimed to enhance automatic 
stabilisers usually mitigate consequences of risks of households having direct impact 
on household’s saving (Challe and Ragot, 2013). For example generous safety nets 
will encourage households to save less, making them more likely to be liquidity 
constrained when aggregate shock occurs (the implications of liquidity constrained 
households are described in next sub-chapter). If the income tax is progressive, it 
satisfies conditions necessary to work through all four channels. It makes the 
disposable income less volatile, changes marginal returns from working during the 
cycle, redistributes the income and partly also provides insurance. 
Obviously, we cannot assume that making the tax system more and more progressive 
would indefinitely boost the positive effect (negative correlation) on output volatility 
and this is somehow formalised in paper written by Vanhala (2006) pointing out the 
importance of initial level of progression. According to the author’s results, a 
revenue-neutral change to more progressive tax system when the tax system is 
already progressive results in lower output steady state, but more importantly it 
amplifies the response to shocks. On the other hand, increasing tax progressivity 
when the initial tax is proportional will decrease the output volatility and dampen the 
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response to productivity shock and also its persistence in the economy is shorter. This 
idea is in line with work of Chen and Guo (2013) who studied the relationship of 
progressive taxation and equilibrium determinacy in real business cycle with 
productive government spending. Their analysis offers satisfactory explanation for 
the observed decrease of output volatility after the Tax reform act of 1986 which 
reduced the initially very progressive US tax schedule. More doubt about the 
stabilizing effect of progressive tax was raised by Fanti and Manfredi (2003), who 
investigated the dynamic effect of tax progression in multiplier-accelerator model 
concluding that increasing the coefficient of progression is output destabilizing. 
2.3 The role of disposable income and consumption 
The traditional theory of automatic stabilisers firmly relies on the link between 
disposable income and actual consumption. If we accept the simplest Keynesian 
consumption equation (i.e. 𝐶 = 𝑐𝑌𝐷), where 𝑌𝐷stands for disposable income and c 
for constant marginal propensity to consume, the negative (in terms of sign) effect of 
progressive tax on GDP volatility is inevitable, although it mostly affects the 
consumption. The conflict of this idea with Ricardian equivalence, suggesting that 
timing of taxes does not matter as for given spending taxes will have to be paid 
sooner or later was already mentioned above. However, there are several reasons why 
the Ricardian equivalence is likely to fail. Blanchard (2000) names four of them:  
1. Death: Current tax payers might not be there to face the adjusted taxes in future  
2. Myopia: The adjustments of taxes may be too far in the future to even think about 
it and adjust agent’s decisions. 
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3. Credit constraints: some people, also called rule-of-thumb consumers, might face 
difficulties to borrow against future income, thus their consumption is affected by 
disposable income. 
4. Insurance: As long as the taxes are rather proportional than lump-sum, the 
uncertainty of labour income is reduced which affects consumption.  
At least some portion of the market participants will be affected by one of the above 
four reasons. Hence, the progressive tax will influence their decisions and market 
outcomes. Kremer and Stähler (2013) introduce the rule-of-thumb consumers to real 
business cycles model with labour market frictions and identify significant 
differences in consumption paths of constrained and optimizing households. 
Consumption volatility increases in the progressivity of tax system in case of 
optimizers, while it reduces the consumption volatility for rule-of-thumb households. 
Kremer and Stähler (2013) explain the increase in optimizer’s consumption volatility 
by inter-temporal consumption shifting and by the more volatile “disposable 
income”. They present the so called income effect making the optimizers to consume 
more unpredictably due to stabilised employment and vacancy costs as a result of 
higher tax progression. At the same time, as productivity shock and its wage effect 
dies out over time, the future taxes are less affected by current productivity shocks, 
when the tax schedule is progressive. Therefore optimizing households expect higher 
tax rates after the negative productivity shocks and postpone some of their expected 
future income losses. The opposite intuition holds for the positive productivity shocks 
making the consumption of optimizing households more volatile. It follows from the 
above reasoning that the final effect of tax progressivity on consumption is 
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determined by the amplitudes of individual effects or more precisely by the portion of 
rule-of-thumb households in the economy. 
2.4 Empirical review 
One of the first paper that analysed the effect of tax progression as an automatic 
stabiliser was written by Fatas and Mihov (2000) who analysed a sample of 20 
OECD economies. However their study was rather simple and only complementary 
as they analysed several other fiscal policy tools. The simple regression of output 
volatility on the marginal tax rate as a measure of tax progressivity yields significant 
and negative relationship. However, if they include also average tax rate as a proxy 
for government size, it is difficult to distinguish which of these rates is more relevant 
for automatic stabilization as they both become insignificant because of their high 
collinearity.  
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) also studied the implications of marginal tax rate and 
concluded that its role as an automatic stabiliser is rather small. They studied the tax 
system of US economy through 80’ and 90’ and found a significant decrease in the 
stabilizing potential of marginal tax rate throughout the years. This could be 
attributed to Tax reform act of 1986 that reduced the marginal tax rates and overall 
progressivity of US tax schedule. According to their results the marginal tax rate in 
US in 1995 might offset from 2 to 8 percent of initial shock.  
To our knowledge Attinasi et al. (2011) is the most complex empirical analysis of tax 
progressivity as an automatic stabiliser. The analysis is based on sample of OECD 
countries between years 1982 and 2009 and the authors could find supportive 
evidence for negative correlation of tax progressivity and output volatility in several 
different specifications of the model and for different estimating methods, from 
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simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator through instrument variables (IV) to 
fixed effect models (FE). Comparing the results authors conclude that OLS estimator 
using averages over 7 years fixed windows is the most appropriate model yielding 
sufficiently reliable results. The negative coefficient of tax progressivity measure is 
significant at least at 5% confidence level for majority of model specifications and at 
10% confidence level for the rest of model specifications accounting for other several 
more or less relevant variables. They constructed a tax progressivity measure based 
on the ratio of average tax rate and marginal tax rate of average production worker 
and used the standard deviation of log changes of real GDP over the time periods as a 
main measure of GDP volatility. The proposed model accounted also for openness of 
the economy, purchasing power parity, proxy for government size, measure of 
financial development and few variables to account for current economic situation. 
Attinasi et al. (2011) demonstrate the results on case of Switzerland in 2000 as 
follows: an increase of Swiss marginal tax rate, faced by average production worker, 
from 22.2% to 30.3% or a drop in average tax rate from 10.6% to 0.5%, 
corresponding to one standard deviation increase of the progressivity measure, would 
result in reduction of Switzerland’s mean output volatility by 18% from 1.7 to 1.4. To 
further check the robustness of results, the authors performed other estimations using 
different volatility measures and alternative fixed-windows. We see the main 
shortcoming of this paper in its narrow measure of tax progressivity, which only 
measures the tax progressivity faced by single worker earning average wage. In fact, 
there might be nobody earning this average wage and the average and marginal tax 
rates faced by other income level workers could be significantly different. Therefore, 
we present a new measure of tax progressivity in chapter 4. 
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A similar approach was followed by Mattesini and Rossi (2012) who conducted short 
empirical analysis to verify a “side outcome” of their New Keynesian model with 
progressive labour taxes on sample of 24 OECD countries. Their progressivity 
measure is built on long run average tax rate and elasticity of the tax rate to the 
relevant tax base to correspond with the theoretical model. As a dependent variable 
they do not use only volatility of output, but complement their analysis by studying 
the effect of tax progressivity on inflation volatility and volatility of hours worked. 
The authors accounted for several control variables such as standard deviation of 
government purchases, standard deviation of the terms of trade, employment 
protection index and union density as variables capturing the features of labour 
market, identified as possible determinant of macroeconomic volatility (see for 
example Campolmi and Faia, 2011). They also include the dummy for EU members 
and control variable for size of the economy. The OLS estimates suggest that 
progressivity has significant (10% confidence level) impact on output volatility and 
enters the regression with negative sign. From the list of control variables only 
volatility of government expenditures, employment protection, and EU membership 
are significant. Employment protection enters with negative sign, while volatility of 
government expenditures and EU dummy variable with positive sign. The EU 
dummy variable might capture the effect of trade openness identified as important by 
Rodrik (1998) or Attinasi et al. (2011) and which is not accounted for in the 
regression of Mattesini and Rossi (2012). Regarding the other dependent variables, 
the authors found even more significant negative effects of tax progressivity on 
volatility of inflation and also, in contrast with Moldovan (2010), on hours worked. 
Dolls et al. (2012) used a micro simulation models to study the tax-benefit system of 
19 European countries and US economy to examine the extent to which the automatic 
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stabilisers influence the household’s disposable income and demand in presence of 
macroeconomic shocks. They found that the stabilizing effect is bit stronger in 
Europe compared to US economy, even though there is a great heterogeneity among 
European countries. This could be explained by on average higher tax progressivity 
in Europe. In case of proportional income shock, Dolls et al. (2012) estimated the 
stabilization effect of automatic stabilisers to reach up to 22% in the EU and 17% in 
the US. The differences are more significant in case of unemployment shock, where 
the cushioning effect was estimated to range from 13% to 30% for EU countries and 
from 7% to 20% for the US economy. It was also shown that automatic stabilisers are 
weaker in countries from south and east Europe compared to for example Nordic 
countries. 
2.5 Progressivity measures 
The progressive tax is defined as a tax levied at rate that increases in the tax base i.e. 
the larger the tax base the higher the tax rate. Therefore its marginal tax rate is higher 
than the steadily increasing average tax rate and if this holds for all levels of income 
the tax rate is said to be uniformly progressive (Røed and Strøm, 2002). The 
alternative, when the marginal tax rate is lower than the average tax rate, is said to be 
regressive, and if the marginal tax rate equals the average tax rate, the tax is 
proportional. So far this seems to be straight forward, however the problem emerges 
if we want to compare the degree of progressivity of two countries as it may vary 
with the income levels. It is not rare that the tax schedule is progressive for some 
income levels whereas it is proportional or even regressive for other income levels. 
Moreover, even if the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate, the 
“degree” of tax progressivity, in sense of the steepness of average tax rate curve, will 
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decrease with increasing level of income due to the fact that it does not make sense to 
set the marginal tax rate ≥ 100%. It is now evident that the average tax rate is capped 
by the highest marginal tax rate and will approach this rate if the income goes to 
infinity. According to Hemming and Keen (1983) the tax system is more progressive 
than another for a given pre-tax income distribution if and only if the Lorenz curve of 
after-tax income distribution given by the more progressive tax lies below or on the 
Lorenz curve given by the less progressive tax. The tax which satisfies the above 
condition for all pre-tax income distribution is said to be uniformly more progressive 
tax. Therefore a uniformly progressive tax as defined by (Røed and Strøm, 2002) is 
uniformly more progressive than proportional tax as defined by Hemming and Keen 
(1983). Even though this gives us some intuition how to compare individual tax 
systems it only leaves us with ordinal comparison and we would rather need a 
cardinal function describing the degree of tax progressivity so we can quantitatively 
analyze its effects. 
It follows the above discussion that the first and very important issue of this analysis 
is to find a proper measure of the degree of tax progressivity. This measure should be 
(i) in line with the definition of progressive tax  (ii) comparable across the years and 
as well across different countries (iii) capture the link between income tax revenues 
and household income distribution (iv) robust and yet simple. There were few 
different measures used in the previous literature that can be divided into two groups: 
the individual or local tax progressivity measures and global tax progressivity 
measures. 
2.5.1 Local tax progressivity measures 
The local progressivity measures are focusing on the degree of tax progression for 
each possible income. It measures by how much the average tax rate increases in 
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income. Musgrave and Thin (1948) presented four local measures of income tax 
progressivity out of which two where extensively used in the literature, the liability 
progression and residual income progression (Kristjánsson and Lambert, 2014). The 
former, liability progression (LP), is the elasticity of tax liability with respect to pre-
tax income and the latter, residual income progression (RP), is the elasticity of after-
tax income with respect to income before tax. We can represent those measures by 








, 𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦) < 1 (2.2) 
 
Where 𝑦 is the level of income, 𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦) stands for marginal tax rate and 𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦) for 
average tax rate for given y. It holds for both that positive flat or proportional income 
tax yields 𝐿𝑃 = 𝑅𝑃 = 1 for all y. If the tax is progressive 𝐿𝑃 > 1 and 𝑅𝑃 < 1 at 
least for some levels of income y. The regressive tax yields opposite results i.e. 
𝐿𝑃 < 1 and 𝑅𝑃 > 1. Therefore the more progressive tax rate, the higher is the LP 
measure and the lower is the RP measure. Note that the residual income progression 
measure is defined also for zero tax rates.  
The other two local measures defined by Musgrave and Thin (1948) are average tax 
rate progression - derivative of average tax rate with respect to pre-tax income, and 
marginal tax rate progression – derivative of marginal tax rate with respect to pre-tax 
income. However, these did not get as much attention in the literature so far. 
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Attinasi et al. (2011) defines his personal income tax measure as 1 − 𝑅𝑃(𝑤), where 
𝑤 is the income of average production worker, full time employed, not married and 
without children as reported by the standard OECD statistics. The main drawback of 
such measure is its narrow focus on average production worker. The RP for such a 
worker may be almost identical for two individual countries even though the tax 
schedule is completely different over the whole income distribution. It was also 
shown that married women may be much more important for a model’s outcome then 
single men without children (Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002). 
2.5.2 Global tax progressivity measures 
Despite the described weaknesses of local tax measures, we can use them in the 
representative agent models without any loss of generality as these models rely on the 
fact that all agents (workers) are equal with the same income and therefore are 
subject to identical tax rate and tax progression. However, as pointed out by Røed 
and Strøm (2002) there is no reason to care about tax progression if all workers are 
equal as no redistribution would be required and the same amount of tax revenues 
could be collected by non-distortionary lump-sum tax at zero efficiency costs. 
The global tax progressivity measures are designed to overcome this issue by 
focusing on the degree of redistribution and allowing for heterogeneity of income, 
workers, and their preferences about the trade-off between consumption and leisure. 
So far, there is no single generally accepted measure of global progressivity. Beside 
the four local measures, Musgrave and Thin (1948) presented also one global 
measure of tax progressivity, effective progression, lately redefined by Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977), who built their measure on the difference of pre-tax and after-tax 
Gini coefficients for given income distribution. This kind of measures basically 
focuses on measuring the redistributive effect by comparing hypothetically 
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proportional tax system, presented by pre-tax income, with after-tax income and 
hence account for various tax exemptions and tax allowances that usually make the 
system more progressive (Verbist and Figari, 2014). The tax system is said to be 
progressive if it decreases the inequality and so the redistribution effect is positive.  
An influential global progressivity measure was constructed by Kakwani (1977) who 
measures the deviation of tax system from proportionality as difference between 
concentration coefficient of taxes
1
 (C) and the Gini coefficient (G) of before-tax 
income: 
 𝐾 = 𝐶 − 𝐺 (2.3) 
 
Since these measures are based on Lorenz curve and tax concentration curve it is 
necessary to collect detailed micro data to be able to construct them and hence restrict 
the application to few countries.  
A different approach was proposed by Ebert (1992). His global measure, built on the 
theory of local measures, takes the geometric average of residual income 
progressions for incomes of all workers in the economy. 
                                                 
1
 C can be also viewed as Gini index of tax liability, see Milanovic (1994) for more on concentration 
coefficient of taxes. 
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3 Methodology 
As already pointed out in the literature review, in contrast with the effect of 
government size, the literature empirically investigating the relationship between 
output volatility and the income tax progressivity is relatively limited. In fact, to the 
current author’s knowledge, there have been only two works presented on this topic 
and both, Attinasi et al. (2011) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012), heavily relied on OLS 
estimation with some extensions to IV and FE estimation in the former. If we follow 
these two papers we would suppose following standard linear regression model: 
 y = Xβ + ε (3.1) 
Where y is the (n × 1) vector of the dependent variable, GDP volatility measure in 
our case, X is the (n × k) design matrix, with k regressors, ε is the unobserved error 
term, and β being the (n × k) matrix of slope parameters we want to estimate. In 
such setting the researcher faces the model uncertainty issue widely addressed in 
growth literature including influential paper of Fernández et al. (2001a). The model 
uncertainty issue refers to the limited knowledge of the researcher about the true 
model resulting in possible inclusion of irrelevant regressors in the design matrix X 
which results in inefficiencies or even in overspecification bias. Similarly, omitting 
some important variable from the regression could result in omitted variable bias.  
In our view the analysis of output volatility, which is in fact determined by different 
growth rates in consecutive years, suffers from the model uncertainty issue similarly 
to the growth analysis. Moreover, the aim of this work is to find evidence in the data 
for an effect of income tax progressivity on the GDP volatility, which could be seen 
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as our uncertainty about including the measure of tax progressivity in the model. A 
widely used method, especially in growth literature, to deal with the model 
uncertainty is called Bayesian model averaging and we briefly describe some 
important characteristics of this method in following sections. Throughout the chapter 
we heavily rely on Koop (2003), Eicher et al. (2011), Feldkircher and Zeugner 
(2009), and Zeugner (2011) 
3.1 Bayesian Theory 
Bayesian econometrics is derived from few simple rules of probability making the 
methods extremely universal. This is also one of the main advantages that helped the 
Bayesian methods to become a popular approach among the researchers. Consider 
two random variables, A and B. Using the simple probability rules we can write: 
 p(A ∩ B) = p(A|B)p(B) (3.2) 
 
Which simply says the joint probability density of random variables A and B 
“p(A ∩ B)” equals to the conditional probability density of A, given B “p(A|B)” 
multiplied by the marginal probability density of B “p(B)”. Similarly we can arrive 
to: 
 p(A ∩ B) = p(B|A)p(A). (3.3) 
Merging equations (3.2) and (3.3) together and simple rearranging results in Bayes’ 
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To give the reader more intuition how the Bayes’ theorem applies in data analysis, 
consider a matrix of data denoted D and θ being a matrix of the parameters for a 
model which tries to describe the D. For now, we want to learn about θ given the 
data D. Bayesian econometrics can help us by applying the equation (3.4). If we treat 






Our main interest here is the expression p(θ|D) (i.e. we are interested in using the 
data to learn about the parameters in a model), which is referred to as the posterior 
density. The term p(D|θ) is basically the probability density function for the data 
conditional on the parameters of the model, also called the data generating function 
and here referred as the likelihood function, p(θ) is referred to as prior density 
(Koop, 2003). In fact, the right hand side of the equation (3.5) uses the available data 
to update our prior believe about θ, resulting in posterior p(θ|D), which summarizes 
all the available information about the parameter θ. The BMA further builds on the 
equation (3.5). 
3.2 Bayesian Model Averaging 
To deal with the model uncertainty, BMA firstly estimates all the possible model 
specifications given the available data and secondly averages over all the models 
using their individual posterior probabilities as the weights. From this short 
description it is obvious that we are dealing with large amount of models. For k 
                                                 
2
 Bayesian theory believes the parameters of model are not given but as a random variable follow a 
probability distribution. Frequentist econometrics criticise this believe saying the parameter matrix 𝜃 is 
not a random variable. For more on the reasoning why Bayesian believes are appropriate see for 
example Poirier (1995). 
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available regressors, we have K = 2k possible subsets of those regressors and hence 
also 2k models. Let us denote those models as Mi, where i = 1, … , K. Then the 







So we have a posterior, likelihood, and prior for each model, which will allow us to 
derive the posterior model probabilities, p(Mi|D), that are used as weights in the 
BMA. Using the equation (3.4) with A = D and B = Mi, we obtain the crucial 
formula for computing the posterior model probability (PMP) of model Mi, which is 







Where p(Mi) is called the prior model probability, and refers to researcher’s 
expectations about the probability of model Mi being the correct one, before looking 
at the data. And p(D|Mi) is the marginal likelihood (the probability density of the 
data, given the model Mi) which can be derived from equation (3.6). To do so, we 
have to integrate both sides of the equation with respect to θi and use the fact that the 
left hand side of equation (3.6) is the probability density function and therefore if we 
integrate it with respect to θi we get 1. After simple rearrangement we can arrive to 
the formula for the marginal likelihood: 
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The marginal likelihood depends on the likelihood function of the model Mi, which 
summarizes all the information about θi given the data D, and on the prior density. 
Now, we can derive the PMP from equation (3.7). Moreover, the denominator in 
equation (3.7), p(D), is constant over all the models and thus simply multiplicative 
term in form of ∑ p(D|Ml)p(Ml)
K
l=1 . Therefore the PMP is proportional to marginal 
likelihood of the model times a prior model probability selected by the researcher. 
Formally we can write this proportionality as follows: 
 p(Mi|D) ∝ p(D|Mi)p(Mi) (3.9) 
Following Eicher et al. (2011) let us break down data D to a dependent variable Y, set 
of candidate regressors, X1, … , Xk, and a vector with n elements
3
, all equal to 1, for 
the intercept. In such setting we have 𝐾 = 2𝑘 different models. Model Mi has the 
form  
 






+ ε (3.10) 
The X1
(i)
, … , Xki
(i)
 is subset of X1, … , Xk , β
i = (β1
(i), … , βki
(i)) is a vector of regression 
coefficients to be estimated and ε~N(0, σ2) is the error term. Note that above we 
used θi which denotes the vector of parameters in Mi, θ
i = (α, βi, σ). 
So far we know how to express the PMP, which is useful for comparison of 
individual models, however, we are more interested in the importance of candidate 
regressors. The BMA derives the posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a candidate 
regressor, p(βj ≠ 0|D), by summing the PMPs across the models where the candidate 
                                                 
3
 Note that we have 𝑛 observations available. 
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regressor, Xj, is included. Hence, the PIP expresses the probability that the regressor 
has an effect on the dependent variable. We might also see this as a level of 
significance of the regressor, which is straightforward to interpret as the PIP is a 
probability measure. In the following analysis of the effect of income tax 
progressivity on GDP volatility, PIP is our sole measure of evidence for the effect, so 
it is important to mention, that PIP is reliable measure only under the condition that 
the regression parameters can be interpreted causally. This is violated if for example 
the GDP volatility determines the regressors rather than the other way round. This is 
a general endogeneity issue which we face also in the BMA (Eicher et al., 2011). 
In the same way we obtained PIP, we can also obtain the model weighted posterior 
distribution for any parameter θ. Particularly, we sum up the model specific 
posteriors from equation (3.6) weighted by the PMP of the model across all the 𝐾 
models. Formally written as: 
 
p(θ|D) = ∑ p(θ|Mi, D)p(Mi|D)
K
i=1
  (3.11) 
The equation (3.11) provides us with theoretical ground for computing the posterior 
distribution of coefficients β and as such also for computing the posterior mean and 
posterior standard deviation of the BMA. 
3.3 BMA and Zellner’s g prior 
In the previous section we describe the theoretical background of the BMA which is 
important to understand before analyzing the data. Even though the Bayesian theory 
is relatively straightforward, it requires complex algebra to find the solutions and if 
high number of candidate regressors is available the convenient computation can be 
practically infeasible. A common approach to this is employing Markov chain Monte 
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Carlo algorithm, however, these topics are beyond the scope of this work
4
, and we 
restrict ourselves to necessary minimum which will be useful for better understanding 
of our analysis. For detailed description of computational framework see for example 
Hoeting et al. (1999), Koop (2003) or Fernández et al. (2001b). 
According to Zeugner (2011) the posterior distributions p(θ|D, Mi), and marginal 
likelihoods p(D|Mi) depends on the chosen estimation framework and the literature 
standard is to use a Bayesian linear model with a specific prior structure called 
Zellner’s g prior, built on the work of Zellner (1986). This structure is particularly 
popular for its reduced elicitation of covariance structure and at the same time yields 
a simple expression for the marginal likelihood as shown below. The presented 
framework represents the necessary minimum which is important for understanding 
of the prior setting in the empirical analysis of this work. 
To obtain the posterior distribution from equation (3.11) the researcher is required to 
place two types of priors. The model prior, p(Mi), which is discussed later in this 
chapter, and the priors on model parameters, (α, βi, σ). Fernández et al. (2001b) 
proposed following improper priors
5
 on α and σ: p(α) ∝ 1 which corresponds to 
complete prior uncertainty where the prior is located, and similarly uninformative 
prior on p(σ) ∝ σ−1. The researchers are then formulating their prior (before looking 
at the data) believes on regression coefficients βi into a normal distribution with 
specified mean and variance. We now heavily follow Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) 
                                                 
4
 In our empirical analysis we use 20 candidate regressors which allow us to go through all the models 
in reasonable time, and therefore, we do not have to rely on Markov chain Monte Carlo approximation.  
5
 Zeugner (2011) states that the presented framework is very similar to the natural normal-gamma-
conjugate model, which employs proper prior for 𝛼 and that the resulting posterior statistics are 
virtually identical. 
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and Zeugner (2011) while presenting the importance of Zellner’s g. The conservative 
approach is to assume a mean of zero of the coefficient, reflecting the limited 















The expression (3.12) suggests that the researchers think the coefficients are zero and 
that the variance-covariance structure is somehow in line with the data Xi. The 
hyperparameter g indicates how certain the researchers are about their prior of 
coefficients being zero. The smaller the g, the more certain or conservative the 
researchers are as small g results in low prior coefficient variance. The other way 
round, large g means the researchers are uncertain about the coefficients being zero. 
Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) show that for sample size N > 2 and given the g, the 
posterior distribution of coefficients follows the t-distribution with following 
expected value: 






OLS is the standard OLS estimator for model Mi. It follows from (3.13) that 
the expected value of the coefficients is a convex combination of standard OLS 
estimator and prior mean, zero. Note that for g → ∞ the coefficient estimator 
approaches the OLS estimator, and for g → 0 the coefficient estimator approaches the 
prior mean, zero. Also the posterior covariance of βiis affected by the choice of g: 
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Cov(βi|D, g, Mi) =











Where y̅ is the sample mean and Ri
2 is the OLS R-squared for model Mi. This prior 
framework results in the following simple marginal likelihood which includes penalty 
factor for model size pi: 
 
p(D|Mi, g) ∝ (y − y̅)
′(y − y̅)−
N−1










We include this section to demonstrate that the g prior directly influences the 
posterior mean, posterior covariance matrix and also the marginal likelihood. Few 
popular g priors are presented in following section. 
3.4 Alternative formulations for Zellner’s 𝒈 prior 
Under the presented framework of Zellner’s g prior the researchers are only required 
to decide on the value of scalar hyperparameter, which should reflect their certainty 
about the coefficients being zero. Many different g priors have been developed and 
studied in the literature, with more or less sufficient outcome. This paper presents 3 
such priors which were extensively used in the previous literature and proved to 
outperform its peers. Profound analysis and comparison of various g priors is 
provided in Liang et al. (2008), Eicher et al. (2011) or Fernández et al. (2001b). 
The first prior we consider is the Unit information prior (UIP) which contains 
information approximately equal to the information contained in a single observation 
and was proposed by Kass and Wasserman (1995). This prior is built on Schwarz 
criterion (BIC) as the resulting posterior model probabilities are closely approximated 
by this criterion (Fernández et al., 2001b). In our framework of Zellner’s g we can 
employ such UIP prior by setting the g = N. Eicher et al. (2011) who compared 12 
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candidate priors conclude that UIP prior together with uniform model prior (see next 
section) outperforms the rest on the simulated data as well as on growth data.  
Fernández et al. (2001b) suggest using BRIC prior, which combines the UIP and 
another prior suggested by risk inflation criterion (RIC). In our framework this prior 
can be summarized as g = max (N, K2). The authors argue that setting large g 
minimizes the prior impact on the results which represents the lack of prior 
knowledge. On the other hand, Ciccone and Jarociński (2010) show that large g 
might not be robust enough to some noise in the data. 
The above two priors are fixed priors, so they assign same g to all the models. Liang 
et al. (2008) demonstrate that mixture of g priors may resolve some consistency 
issues and still provide computational tractability. They also propose a hyper g prior 
which is the preferred one by Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009). They suggest the 







1), where a is a parameter from the interval (2,4]. The prior expected value of the 






 and setting a = 4 implies prior shrinkage factor to be 
uniformly distributed over [0,1], while a → 2 corresponds to g → ∞. A popular 






 as it guarantees 
asymptotic consistency (Zeugner, 2011). In this paper if we refer to hyper g prior we 
refer to this setting. 
3.5 Model Priors 
Apart from the g prior, the researchers have to decide on the prior model probability 
to be able to compute the posterior model probability from the equation (3.7). Since 
there is usually a great number of candidate regressors combinations and therefore 
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individual models, it would be very difficult and time demanding to assign each 
model individual probability. The relevance of such prior subjective choice would be 
also questionable. One way how to deal with this issue is to assign all the models the 
same probability, which was firstly suggested by Raftery (1988). Such prior is 
usually called uniform prior and has been commonly used in the literature. The 




regressors, as there are simply more such models than models with 
K
2
∓ 1 regressors 
etc..  
Eicher et al. (2011) and Hoeting et al. (1999) present a more general model proposed 
by Mitchell and Beauchamp (1988) and defined as: 
 







Where δij equals to 1 if regressor Xj is included in model Mi and 0 otherwise and πj 
is the prior probability that βj ≠ 0 in a regression model and it is usually assumed 
that πj = π for j = 1, … , k. Setting π = 0.5 for all models coincides with the uniform 
prior while π < 0.5 imposes a penalty for large models as the prior expected model 
size (m) can be derived as m = πk. Having this said, the researchers can express 
their prior believes about the model size (m) by setting the π =
m
k
. Throughout this 
work, we call this type of model prior a fixed prior.  
Ley and Steel (2009) criticizes using of fixed model prior as uninformative prior, as it 
centres the mass of its distribution around the expected model size and therefore 
contains some information. They propose to treat the π from (3.16) as random 
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variable drawn from Beta (a, b) distribution rahter than fixed parameter. The authors 
suggest to fix a = 1 as it allows for a wide range of prior behaviour and leads to 
reasonable prior assumptions. They also show the choice of m determines the 
parameter b in an equation b =
k−m
m
. The whole framework then generates a prior 
model size distribution that corresponds to the binomial-beta distribution implying an 
increase in prior uncertainty about model size (Ley and Steel, 2009). This type of 
model prior is also favoured over the uniform and fixed prior by Liang et al. (2008). 
In this paper we refer to this model prior as random prior. 
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4 Data 
The corner stone of every empirical analysis are the data. In this section we describe 
the individual variables used in the analysis, its sources and some interesting statistics 
with particular emphasis on the measures of tax progressivity and output volatility.  
The whole data set is constructed from freely accessible databases of World Bank 
(WB), OECD, and European Commission (AMECO database)
6
 and consists of data 
for 31 OECD countries
7
 over 16 years between 2000 and 2015. Therefore, the dataset 
captures several pre-crisis as well as post-crisis years. 
4.1 Volatility measures 
 The output volatility, as the main dependent variable, is measured by standard 
deviation of annual percentage growth rates of GDP per capita, as suggested by 
(Cariolle, 2012). The growth rates are based on constant local currency, and provided 
by WB. To be able to compute the volatility using standard deviations, one needs to 
choose the length of the period over which the volatility is measured. In this work a 
rolling standard deviation over seven-year windows, resulting in 10 periods in the 
dataset, is used. Seven-year window is suggested by Attinasi et al. (2011), but in 
contrast with their work, we opt for rolling window to end up with much higher 
number of time periods and observations. The mean of our volatility measure across 
7-year rolling windows is 2.69, maximum value is 10.32 in the last period (i.e. 2009-
                                                 
6
 EUROPA - Economic and Financial Affairs - Indicators -AMECO database , OECD Statistics, 
OECD data, Data | The World Bank 
7
 List of the countries and description of the data and sources are available in Appendix A 
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2015) in Ireland and the lowest volatility throughout the dataset is in the second 
period (i.e. 2001-2007) in the United Kingdom. Highest average volatility over our 
10 time periods was experienced in Estonia and the lowest in Austria. See figure 4-1 
for comparison of average volatility.  
Figure 4-1: Average volatility of GDP over 10 rolling windows 
 
In our analysis we intend to provide some evidence on channels through which the 
tax progressivity may influence the output volatility. Therefore, we also study the 
impact of tax progressivity on volatility of consumption, investments, and 
government expenditures as the main determinants of GDP and also on volatility of 
hours worked, which directly impacts the output of given economy and which was 
identified as possible channel in the previous literature. All the volatility measures 
throughout this work are measured the same way as the output volatility, using the 
















































































































































































 and Hours worked volatility are measured at per capita level, while the 
volatilities of Government expenditures and Investments are measured at the country 
level. The correlation coefficients of these “channel” variables with our GDP 
volatility measure are reported in table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Volatility Correlations 
 
The correlation coefficients are not high, but the observed order where Consumption 
volatility reports highest and Government expenditures volatility lowest correlation 
with our measure of output volatility was expected. When later analyzing the data, it 
is important to have in mind that if we find similar effect of tax progressivity on 
volatility of consumption and government expenditures, the consumption is much 
more important channel due to its higher correlation with output volatility. 
Interestingly, the correlation coefficient of Investment volatility with the measure of 
output volatility is negative, suggesting that Investment volatility does not determines 
the output volatility. 
4.2 Tax progressivity measures 
To find the appropriate tax progressivity measure for our analysis is one of the main 
challenges of this thesis. Ideally we would use one of the global measures described 
in chapter 2, as in our view, those measures would be more relevant for our analysis 
than local measures. Unfortunately, none of the presented measures was available to 
us for recent years we want to analyse. Constructing such measure is not our intention 
                                                 
8
 Note that if we refer to our variables we use capital first letter, whereas if we generally write about 
volatility of some variables or about tax progressivity, we use lowercase letters. 
Hours worked vol. Consumption vol. Investment vol. Government expenditures vol.
GDP per capita vol. 0,196 0,284 -0,156 0,049
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as it is very time and also data demanding and whole new paper could be written on 
such topic. On the other hand, local measures are usually based on individual average 
and marginal tax rates which could be more easily changed by governments to adjust 
the tax progressivity. The measures are also more straightforward and easier to 
understand what is behind the individual measures. 
We already criticized the PIT measure of Attinasi et al. (2011) for being too narrow 
in the way it measures only the progressivity faced by average production worker. 
Therefore, we construct a completely new measure of tax progressivity. As described 
in section 2.5. progressive tax system could be described as steadily increasing 
average tax rate in the tax base. When there is a flat tax, the average tax rate is 
constant over the different levels of tax base, and the regressive tax is characterized 
by decreasing average tax rate in the tax base. Having this said, it is obvious that the 
slope of average tax rate in tax base determines whether the tax system is progressive, 
regressive, or flat. Therefore, we see the slope of average tax curve as a good 
candidate to compare the level of progressivity in different countries. Regarding the 
data availability, we are restricted to rely on the OECD database
9
 which provides 
marginal and average tax rates for 8 different family types. These include single 
workers earning 67%, 100%, and 167%
10
 of average wage in given country, that 
                                                 
9
 The average and marginal tax rates are provided only for years from 2000 to 2015 which also 
restricts our dataset. Particularly, we use net personal average (marginal) tax rate.  
10
 The other family types are: two earners married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the 
other at 33% or 66% (two different family types) having 2 children. Next family type is the same as 
the previous one with the second earner at 33%, but without child, then one earner at 100% of average 
earnings married couple with 2 children and the last one is single person at 67% of average earnings 
with 2 children. 
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allow us to compute some proxy of the slope of average tax rate faced by single 
workers. 
For now, we have three data points of the average tax rate curve of single worker for 
67%, 100% and 167% income levels. For our final measure of tax progressivity we 
first compute the average slope of average tax rate curve between the average tax 
rates corresponding to 67% and 100% level of income and between 100% and 167% 
level of income separately. Secondly, we take an average of the two slopes to get 
some proxy measure of the overall steepness of the average tax rate curve. It might 
seem inconsistent to ascribe same weights to both slopes for the averaging, while one 
measures slope only across the length of 33 points and the second across the length of 
67 points. However, we believe the density of individuals with earnings within the 
interval from 67% to 100% of average wage is significantly higher than density of 
individuals with earnings within the interval from 100% to 167% of average tax 
wage, as the wages are bounded from below and generally the median wage is 
usually lower than average wage. The inconsistency prevails, as our measure fails to 
account for the distribution of workers across the income levels, however, in contrast 
with PIT of Attinasi et al. (2011), it better captures the differences in tax 
progressivity faced by different types of workers. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
take averages of this measure over the 7-year rolling windows and call the measure 
Tax progressivity 1. According to this measure, the highest average tax progressivity 
over the ten studied time periods was faced by single workers in Ireland (2.05) and 
the lowest in Estonia, which also reported highest average volatility.  
To be able to perform some robustness checks, we employ other two measures of tax 
progressivity, which are built on the PIT measure. In contrast with Attinasi et al. 
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(2011) we do not take only PIT faced by the average production worker, but compute 
the PIT for all the single workers with no child, and take their average to construct 
the second measure of tax progressivity, which we refer to as Tax progressivity 2. 
Tax progressivity 3 is then defined as average of PIT measure for all the family types 
as provided by OECD statistics, except the single worker with 2 children, as that one 
is subject to negative average tax rate for many countries which might bias the 
measure. All the tax progressivity measures are averaged over the 7-year rolling 
windows.  
Table 4-2 captures the correlation coefficients among our three progressivity 
measures, PIT of average production worker (PITaw) as defined and used by Attinasi 
et al. (2011), and our GDP volatility measure.  
Table 4-2: Correlation among tax progressivity measures and GDP volatility 
 
The correlation of our main measure of tax progressivity with the measure of GDP 
volatility is low compared to other measures based on the PIT, however, the 
relevance of the measure is supported by high correlation with the other measures. At 
the same time the correlation of PIT measures with output volatility is increasing if 
we average over more family types. Overall, table 4-2 suggests our new measure is 
relevant, while it can provide some new evidence on the role of tax progressivity in 
GDP smoothening.  
GDP p.c. vol. Tax prog 1 Tax prog. 2 Tax prog. 3 PITaw
GDP p.c. vol. 1.000
Tax prog 1 -0.016 1.000
Tax prog. 2 -0.106 0.830 1.000
Tax prog. 3 -0.132 0.712 0.838 1.000
PIT -0.051 0.579 0.660 0.709 1.000
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4.3 Control variables 
To conduct meaningful analysis, we try to control for other relevant variables, which 
were found to affect the output volatility in previous literature. Using the BMA we do 
not deal with the model uncertainty, so we can afford to employ more control 
variables compared to similar studies. 
Following the influential paper of Fatás and Mihov (2001) studying the effect of 
government size on GDP volatility, we control for the Government size as the well 
documented automatic stabiliser, Terms of trade volatility as the fundamental source 
of risk, Openness of the economy, as such economy is more sensitive to fluctuations 
of world markets, and GDP per capita. The authors also include variable capturing 
the sectoral specialization, which we substitute by two variables, first one capturing 
the share of employed people in industrial sector - Industry - and the second one in 
Agriculture. Mattesini and Rossi (2012) further  use dummy variable accounting for 
EU membership and also included variables capturing the features of labour market, 
strictness of Employment protection and degree of centralization in labour contracts, 
Union density, as labour market institutions where shown to be important in 
explaining macroeconomic volatility (see for example Abbritti and Weber, 2010). 
Following Attinasi et al. (2011), we control also for volatility Purchasing power 
parity and level of Urbanization, even though the latter is in their paper only used as 
an instrument variable
11
. Except for the variables already mentioned, Easterly et al. 
(2001) in their large study of growth volatility determinants found evidence also for 
the effect of financial sector development, measured as the ratio of credit provided to 
public over the GDP - Credit, and Inflation, and following Cavallo (2009) we also 
                                                 
11
 Note that if urbanization is valid instrument, it is correlated with the output volatility. 
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include dummy for Landlocked countries, total Population and variable capturing 
Education measured as school enrolment rate. Cavallo (2009) also includes dummy 
variable for oil exporters, which we replace by variable capturing the total Oil 
production.  
Jaimovich and Siu (2009) found that changes in the age composition of labour force 
matters in studying the business cycle volatility. Therefore we include control 
variable capturing the Age dependency. The 19
th 
and last control variable we include 
in our dataset is Life expectancy, a well documented determinant of GDP growth, 
included by Bekaert et al. (2006) in their model explaining the growth volatility. 
Following Moral-Benito (2009) we take an average over the 7-year windows for flow 
variables, and for the stock variables, we take the value from the first year of given 
window. 
  While there might be other variables influencing the output volatility, for example 
volatility of money growth, for which we were not able to get sufficient data, 
compared to the papers of Attinasi et al. (2011) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012), 
studying the same phenomenon, we control for most of the variables they do, and add 
some more, which were shown or at least suspected to influence the output volatility. 
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5 Results 
In this chapter, we present results of the empirical analysis studying the effect of the 
income tax progressivity on GDP volatility and possible channels of such effect. To 
derive the results, we use BMA technique outlined in Chapter 3, which has not been 
yet employed for the analysis of this effect. Therefore, BMA might shed more light 
on the role of tax progressivity in GDP smoothening. We start with a baseline model 
and latter provide robustness checks using different model as well as parameter 
priors. Section 5.3 then provides analysis of the tax progressivity on volatility of 
different components of GDP, and hours worked volatility. For the estimation we rely 
on BMS package in R software which was developed by Feldkircher and Zeugner 
(2009). 
5.1 The Baseline Model 
The baseline model and also the starting point of the empirical analysis is a Bayesian 
model averaging technique using model prior set as „uniform“ and g prior set to 
“UIP”. Table 5-1 shows the results of the baseline model using our dataset including 
the Tax progressivity measure 1 as the variable of our main interest and volatility of 
GDP per capita as dependent variable, described in chapter 4. The second column, 
posterior inclusion probability (PIP), expresses the importance of the variable in 
explaining the data as it equals to the sum of posterior model probabilities (PMP) of 
all models including the given variable. Throughout the chapter of results, we follow 
Eicher et al. (2012) and interpret the PIPs as follows: PIPs lower than 50% indicates 
lack of evidence for an effect, PIP in the range from 50% to 75% indicates weak 
evidence for an effect, PIP in the range from 75% to 95% indicates positive evidence 
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for an effect, 95% < 𝑃𝐼𝑃 < 99% indicates strong evidence for an effect, and finally 
𝑃𝐼𝑃 > 99% indicates decisive evidence for an effect. 
Table 5-1: Baseline model results 
 
According to the outcome of the baseline model, only the covariate of Openness 
satisfies the 99% threshold indicating decisive effect. The importance of the 
economy’s openness in explaining the GDP volatility was already well documented 
by Rodrik (1998) or more recently by di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). We also 
find strong evidence for an effect of Government size, measured as percentage share 
of government revenues on GDP, which is the central focus of literature studying 
automatic stabilization (see for example Fatás and Mihov, 2001). There is a positive 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9959% 0.029512 0.006130 1.00000
Government size 95.0797% -0.082139 0.029847 0.00000
EU dummy 94.5664% 1.067495 0.399340 0.99999
Tax progressivity 1 92.4789% -8.166170 3.345907 0.00000
Union density 80.8705% 0.015797 0.009572 0.99905
GDP per capita 57.7815% -0.000017 0.000018 0.00004
Agriculture 57.0984% 0.090679 0.091832 0.99999
Credit 46.4194% 0.002062 0.002612 0.99953
Land locked dummy 46.1981% -0.290516 0.364080 0.00000
Terms of trade vol. 37.5776% 0.044018 0.066320 0.99312
Urban 36.5457% -0.008096 0.012589 0.00033
Education 32.8520% -0.007734 0.012869 0.00000
Age dependency 24.1138% 0.012104 0.025925 0.99518
Inflation 23.7541% 0.019681 0.042664 0.98825
Industry 22.0111% 0.008216 0.020176 0.93393
PPP vol. 21.4787% 0.022788 0.053778 0.98560
Life expectancy 20.7440% -0.019736 0.047827 0.00664
Oil production 9.4754% 0.000000 0.000001 0.28538
Population 8.7085% 0.000000 0.000001 0.86397
Employment protection 6.5286% 0.003309 0.038707 0.76155
Mean no. Regressors: 9.14 Model Prior: uniform / 10
No. models visited: 1048576 g-Prior: UIP
No. Observation: 301
GDP per capita volatility
Unconditional
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evidence for the effect of the EU dummy variable, and more importantly, for the 
effect of the Tax progressivity 1, which is the variable of our main interest. 
Particularly, there is a 92.48% probability that there is an effect of our progressivity 
measure on the GDP per capita volatility, according to the baseline model.  This 
model also indicates positive evidence for an effect of Union density and weak 
evidence for an effect of GDP per capita and for variable capturing the share of 
people employed in agriculture sector in the total employment. We find lack of 
evidence for an effect of the remaining variables. To get a comprehensive 
visualization of models and PIPs see figure 5-1 showing 1000 best models. 
Figure 5-1: Model Inclusion Based on 1000 Best Models (Baseline) 
 
The blue colour (darker in grey scale) indicates positive coefficient, red colour 
(lighter in grey scale) corresponds to negative coefficient and white cell means the 
variable was not included in the model (i.e. zero coefficient). The models are scaled 
by PMP on the x axis. From this figure we can also see that the best model according 
Results  40 
 
to PMP includes covariates of Openness, Government Size, EU dummy, Tax 
progressivity 1, Union density, Agriculture, dummy for land locked countries, and 
measure of urbanization. However the PMP of this model is only 2%, which is rather 
low. Even though it is the best model, relying on the results of this individual model 
would be most probably misleading and therefore model averaging seems to be 
appropriate technique for our analysis. This figure also shows the importance of the 
Openness covariate, which is included in all the 1000 best models and together with 
the Government size, EU dummy and Tax progressivity 1 forms the building blocks 
of models explaining the volatility of GDP, which was already indicated by high 
PIPs. 
The third column of table 5-1 shows the unconditional coefficients. These are 
weighted averages over all the models, including those where the respective covariate 
is not included, meaning the respective coefficient equals to zero. Posterior standard 
deviations (SD) are reported in the fourth column and the fifth column reports 
posterior probability of a positive coefficient of given covariate, conditional on its 
inclusion in the model. We can see that according to the baseline specification the 
effect of tax progressivity on GDP volatility has a negative sign in all model 
specifications where the variable was included.  
Conditional coefficients, averaging only across the models where the respective 
covariates were included, are reported in  
. Whereas unconditional coefficients can be seen as estimates of an effect adjusted for 
the probability of inclusion, the conditional coefficients captures only the estimated 
effect and therefore the absolute value of conditional coefficient is always higher or 
equal to the unconditional effect of given covariate. 
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To objectively compare the importance of individual variables and magnitudes of 
their effects, it is useful to look at the standardized coefficients, which we obtain if 
the dependent variable and all the regressors are normalized to mean 0 and variance 1 
to bring them to the same order of magnitude. These standardized unconditional and 
conditional coefficients are also reported in  
. 
Table 5-2: Baseline Model Results (cont.) 
 
The order by magnitude highly correlates with the order by PIP (i.e. regressors with 
high PIP seems to be important also in term of the magnitudes). In this baseline 
setting, the tax progressivity seems to be an important determinant of GDP volatility 
as higher importance could be only ascribed to the well documented effects of 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita volatility
Variable Name Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD
Openness 0.030 0.006 0.533 0.111 0.533 0.111
Government size -0.086 0.024 -0.361 0.131 -0.379 0.105
EU dummy 1.129 0.315 0.326 0.122 0.345 0.096
Tax progressivity 1 -8.830 2.498 -0.214 0.088 -0.231 0.065
Union density 0.020 0.006 0.206 0.125 0.254 0.083
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 -0.159 0.162 -0.275 0.117
Agriculture 0.159 0.063 0.121 0.122 0.212 0.084
Credit 0.004 0.002 0.085 0.107 0.182 0.083
Land locked dummy -0.629 0.272 -0.073 0.091 -0.158 0.068
Terms of trade vol. 0.117 0.056 0.061 0.093 0.163 0.078
Urban -0.022 0.011 -0.057 0.088 -0.155 0.078
Education -0.024 0.011 -0.035 0.059 -0.107 0.052
Age dependency 0.050 0.030 0.033 0.071 0.138 0.082
Inflation 0.083 0.049 0.033 0.073 0.141 0.084
Industry 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.070 0.129 0.096
PPP vol. 0.106 0.068 0.026 0.062 0.121 0.078
Life expectancy -0.095 0.062 -0.035 0.084 -0.167 0.109
Oil production 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.036 -0.052 0.107
Population 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.032 0.060 0.092
Employment protection 0.051 0.143 0.002 0.018 0.024 0.067
Standardized
Unconditional ConditionalConditional
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Government size, Openness, and also to dummy variable capturing the membership 
in EU, which could be seen as another indicator of economy openness. The 
magnitude of the effect of tax progressivity corresponds to 40% of magnitude of the 
effect of Openness and to 59% of the magnitude of the effect of Government size. 
Regarding the standardized conditional coefficients, all the coefficients are obviously 
higher and the difference is increasing with decreasing PIP. In contrast with the 
unconditional coefficients, the conditional coefficients of Union density and GDP per 
capita are higher than that of Tax progressivity, which indicates the effects of Union 
density and GDP per capita on GDP volatility could have higher magnitudes but we 
are more uncertain about the inclusion of those variables in the true model compared 
to tax progressivity measure. 
Using the uniform model prior, one assigns the same prior probability to every single 




 regressors, where k is the number of explanatory variables, as there is simply 
more models with 
𝑘
2
 regressors then models with 
k 
2
–  1 or 
𝑘
2
 + 1 regressors. As in our 
dataset k=20, using the uniform model prior, we favour models of size 10. However, 
the results also report mean number of regressors, which in our baseline setting 
equals to 9.14. One can come to this number by summing up the PIPs of all variables. 
Figure 5-2 depicts the prior and posterior model size distribution. The difference is 
significant so we try to estimate the model using a different model prior and setting 
the expected model size to 9 as suggested by baseline model. From now on, we are 
only reporting results for variables with PIP higher than 50%, while using the same 
dataset of 20 regressors.  
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Figure 5-2: Posterior Model Size Distribution 
 
Table 5-3: Results with Fixed Prior 
 
Table 5-3 reports the results when using the fixed model prior and setting the prior 
model size to 9. The posterior model size drops to roughly 8.5 implying that PIPs of 
some variables had to decrease as well. The openness of the economy keeps its high 
PIP, while the rest of the variables, satisfying the condition of PIP>50%, reports 
lower PIPs. In case of Tax progressivity 1 it decreases by 4 percentage points to 
88.5% indicating positive evidence for an effect. Also the posterior mean slightly 
decreases, however, this is attributable to lower PIP, as if we compare the conditional 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9954% 0.029141 0.006052 1.000000
Government Size 91.7648% -0.079500 0.033546 0.000000
EU dummy 90.8796% 1.014577 0.442101 0.999991
Tax Progressivity 1 88.5132% -7.806118 3.683108 0.000000
Union Density 76.8194% 0.014925 0.009902 0.998610
Agriculture 55.5211% 0.090150 0.092811 0.999986
GDP per capita 55.0240% -0.000017 0.000018 0.000039
Mean no. regressors 8.54 Model Prior Fixed/ 9
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior UIP
No. Obs. 301
Unconditional
GDP per capita volatility
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coefficients, reported in table 5-4, the difference when using uniform or fixed model 
prior is negligible. Despite the lower PIP and slight decrease of the unconditional 
posterior mean there is still a positive evidence for the effect, and the effect of tax 
progressivity on GDP volatility has negative sign in all the models, where included. 
Looking at the standardized coefficients, the results are similar to those of baseline 
specification and Tax progressivity ranks 4
th
 in terms of magnitude of unconditional 
coefficients and 6
th
 when comparing magnitudes of standardized conditional 
coefficients. 
Table 5-4: Results with Fixed Priod (cont.) 
 
The best model, with PMP of 2.5%, according to the setting with fixed model prior 
and prior model size of 9 includes the following variables: Openness, Government 
size, EU dummy, Tax progressivity 1, Union density, and Agriculture, and therefore 
favours more parsimonious models, as it does not include Urban and dummy for 
landlocked countries in contrast with the baseline specification using uniform model 
prior. Interestingly, the best model of the baseline setting is the second best model of 
the specification with fixed model prior, and vice versa.  
The third and the last model prior we employ is the random prior. However, when 
setting the prior model size to 9 the resulting posterior model size was just a little 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita volatility
Variable Name Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD
Openness 0.0291 0.0060 0.5267 0.1094 0.5267 0.1093
Government Size -0.0866 0.0247 -0.3491 0.1473 -0.3805 0.1083
EU dummy 1.1164 0.3184 0.3100 0.1351 0.3411 0.0973
Tax Progressivity 1 -8.8192 2.5282 -0.2046 0.0966 -0.2312 0.0663
Union Density 0.0194 0.0063 0.1944 0.1289 0.2530 0.0825
Agriculture 0.1624 0.0615 0.1202 0.1237 0.2164 0.0820
GDP per capita 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1531 0.1636 -0.2783 0.1176
Standardized
Conditional Unconditional Conditional
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below 8 and therefore, we opt for the prior model size set to 8. The results of most 
important regressors are reported in table 5-5.  
Table 5-5: Results with Random Prior 
 
The posterior model size is 7.72 so the prior model size 8 seems more appropriate 
than 9. The results reconfirm the importance of economy openness in explaining the 
GDP volatility. The rest of the variables report lower PIPs and also lower 
coefficients, which partly results from the lower PIPs. The PIP of Tax Progressivity 
drops to 71% and indicates only weak evidence for an effect. Conditional posterior 
mean of Tax Progressivity remains roughly the same as well as the posterior standard 
deviation. The standardized coefficients are similar to the results of uniform and fixed 
model priors.  
Model with the highest PMP of 3.9% includes following regressors: Openness, 
Government size, EU dummy, Tax Progressivity, Union density, and Agriculture. 
Almost the same PMP is assigned to model including only Openness, GDP per capita 
and volatility of purchasing power parity. This somehow differentiates the random 
model prior from the previous priors, as for the first time, Government size, EU 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9964% 0.029771 0.006087 1.000000
Government Size 75.0771% -0.063747 0.043151 0.000000
EU dummy 73.4579% 0.815789 0.564859 0.999974
Tax Progressivity 1 71.2623% -6.255298 4.535477 0.000000
GDP per capita 63.5349% -0.000021 0.000019 0.000024
Union density 61.3108% 0.011865 0.010689 0.997464
Mean no. regressors 7.72 Model Prior Random/ 8
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior UIP
No. Obs. 301
Unconditional
GDP per capita volatility
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dummy, but also the point of our interest, Tax progressivity 1, are not included in the 
second and the third best models. 
Figure 5-3 summarizes the PIP results of above described settings, using 𝑔 prior set 
to UIP and three different model priors, in a comprehensive way. 
Figure 5-3 Comparison of Model Outcomes under Different Model Priors 
 
The Openness of the economy is confirmed by all three model priors as the most 
important determinant of the GDP volatility in our dataset and the resulting PIPs are 
almost overlapping. Beside the openness, the best rated models according to PMP are 
heavily relying on Government size, EU dummy, and in line with our hypothesis also 
on the tax progressivity measure. The exception is random model prior where the 
evidence for an effect of those three variables is weaker. Even more important result 
which coincides for all three model priors presented above is that the effect of tax 
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progressivity has negative sign in all the models (variables combinations), where 
included.  
5.2 The endogeneity issue: 
The advantage of using BMA has been already stated, however, the endogeneity 
problem remains an issue. If any of the explanatory variables is correlated with the 
idiosyncratic error term, the estimation arrives to biased and inconsistent coefficients. 
In the previous literature two of our explanatory variables were suspected to be 
endogenous when estimating the effect on GDP volatility. Rodrik (1998) shows the 
government size might be endogenous as the citizens of largely open and thus highly 
volatile economies tend to opt for bigger governments, resulting in problem of 
simultaneous causality. Fatás and Mihov (2001) conclude the effect of government 
size on GDP volatility is biased if they do not account for endogeneity. On the other 
hand, Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005) did not find evidence to reject the 
exogeneity of government size. Easterly et al. (2001) identified also the ratio of credit 
provided to the private sector to GDP to be endogenous, using standard Hausman test 
for the results of their analysis of determinants of GDP volatility, while Debrun and 
Kapoor (2010) could not reject the exogeneity of this variable.  
In this paper we deal with the endogeneity issue by simple data adjustment. For the 
baseline model we used averaged values of variables Credit and Government size 
over the whole 7-year windows. But now, to avoid possible simultaneous causality, 
we take the value of the first year of each period. These new explanatory variables 
should reduce the probability that simultaneous correlation is present. In fact, we are 
somehow lagging the suspected variable, which is not perfect, but common technique 
how to deal with the issue of endogeneity and at the same time easily applicable to 
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BMA estimation. Similar approach was adopted for example by Rumler and Scharler 
(2011). Moreover, we are not truly interested in the exact effects of government size 
and credit, as the variable of our interest is the tax progressivity. However, the 
estimated coefficient of tax progressivity would be biased if the covariate is 
correlated with one of the endogenous variables.  
We do not suspect tax progressivity to suffer from endogeneity issue, referring to 
Attinasi et al. (2011) explaining that the level of tax progressivity reflects rather 
societal preferences for equality and redistribution, or efficiency considerations rather 
than stabilizing efforts. To check this assumption, we perform standard IV estimation 
with lagged values of Tax progressivity 1 as an instrument for possibly endogenous 
variable Tax progressivity 1. The IV estimation yields similar result as standard OLS 
and using both, Durbin statistics and Hausmann – Wu statistics, we do not find 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous
12
. Therefore, 
we proceed with unchanged Tax progressivity 1 and treating it as exogenous.  
The results of BMA with “lagged” values of Government size and Credit, as 
described above, and using UIP as parameter prior and uniform model prior are 
reported in table 5-6. The estimated average posterior model size is 9.24, which is 
just a little higher than in the baseline specification (9.14), however the individual 
PIPs and coefficients differ significantly. The best model under this specification 
includes: Openness, Government size, EU dummy, Tax progressivity, Union density, 
GDP per capita, Terms of trade volatility, and also the Inflation. 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix B for detailed information on the IV estimation. 
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Table 5-6: Results with "lagged" Government Size and Credit 
 
  
The second-best model includes additional covariate Credit. Let us first have a look 
at the variables suspected from endogeneity. Using the lagged values, the PIP of 
Government size increased above 99% indicating decisive evidence for the effect, 
and also the absolute value of the coefficient grew by approximately 25%. On the 
other hand, both, PIP and estimated coefficient of the variable Credit decreased 
compared to baseline model. The differences in results compared to baseline 
specification suggest the endogeneity is present. In fact, the PIPs of all 4 corner stone 
variables including tax progressivity increased. The PIP of Tax progressivity 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9960% 0.028484 0.005900 1.000000
Government Size 99.7515% -0.102825 0.021105 0.000000
EU dummy 99.5964% 1.239325 0.308042 1.000000
Tax Progressivity 1 98.7518% -9.275179 2.557050 0.000000
Union density 96.6245% 0.022268 0.007352 0.999963
GDP per capita 61.3736% -0.000018 0.000017 0.000041
Terms of Trade vol. 54.9739% 0.070096 0.074133 0.998938
Credit 39.2558% 0.001446 0.002105 0.999466
Mean no. regressors 9.24 Model Prior Uniform
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior UIP
No. Obs. 302
Unconditional
GDP per capita volatility
Variable Name Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD
Openness 0.0285 0.0059 0.5150 0.1067 0.5150 0.1066
Government Size -0.1031 0.0205 -0.4590 0.0942 -0.4602 0.0915
EU dummy 1.2443 0.2984 0.3795 0.0943 0.3811 0.0914
Tax Progressivity 1 -9.3924 2.3495 -0.2431 0.0670 -0.2462 0.0616
Union density 0.0230 0.0062 0.2899 0.0957 0.3001 0.0803
GDP per capita 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1630 0.1540 -0.2655 0.1068
Terms of Trade vol. 0.1275 0.0517 0.0980 0.1037 0.1783 0.0724
Credit 0.0037 0.0017 0.0607 0.0884 0.1546 0.0733
Standardized
Conditional Unconditional Conditional
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indicates strong evidence for an effect and the estimated negative effect on GDP 
volatility is also larger. The conditional posterior sign is still negative with 100% 
probability (i.e. negative across all the averaged models), so our previous results 
regarding the effect of tax progressivity on GDP volatility seems to be robust to 
endogeneity issue of Government size and development of financial sector.  
5.3 Different Priors: 
In contrast with Eicher et al. (2011), Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) found improved 
performance of BMA when using hyper g prior. Table 5-7 reports results of BMA 
using hyper g prior and random model prior with prior expected model size 8 as in 
previous chapter. Using random model prior is favoured setting of Ley and Steel 
(2009). Under the hyper g-prior, all of the variables within our dataset report PIP 
above 50% so there is at least weak evidence of an effect for all of them. High 
average PIP results in posterior mean of almost 16 regressors in the model, despite 
the prior model size set to conservative 8. The parameter a in the hyper g prior 
specification equals to 2.006645, which means the g is very close to unity and 
therefore the coefficients approach the OLS estimates
13
. As in the previous 
specifications, the most important variables in terms of PIP are Openness, EU 
dummy, Government size and Tax progressivity, all of them satisfying the threshold 
to indicate decisive evidence for an effect, while the coefficients are roughly the same 
as in baseline specification.  
                                                 
13
 When manually setting the parameter a to 3.5, ceteris paribus, the results are very similar.  
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Table 5-7: Results under Hyper g Prior and Random Model Prior 
 
In contrast, much higher importance in explaining the GDP volatility is ascribed to 
covariate Credit. The PIP of Credit indicates strong evidence for an effect of this 
covariate and also the coefficient more than doubled compared to the baseline 
specification.  
 In terms of magnitude, comparing the standardized coefficients, Tax progressivity 
ranks 6
th
 when comparing both, conditional and unconditional coefficients. This 
results from overall higher PIPs, which means the difference in conditional and 
unconditional coefficients is not so big and therefore the Union density and also the 
GDP per capita keep their higher magnitudes even when averaged over the models 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9994% 0.030809 0.006157 1.000000
EU dummy 99.9183% 1.123036 0.281037 1.000000
Government Size 99.7977% -0.073085 0.020524 0.000000
Tax Progressivity 1 99.6309% -8.119800 2.361124 0.000000
Credit 96.0015% 0.004908 0.002145 0.999987
Union Density 95.8985% 0.016845 0.007401 0.999818
Urban 91.8930% -0.023061 0.012424 0.000014
Education 90.5569% -0.022141 0.012545 0.000000
GDP per capita 90.3245% -0.000024 0.000014 0.000006
Age dependency 89.3609% 0.049304 0.029288 0.999929
Terms of Trade vol. 85.2944% 0.092923 0.065363 0.998555
Agriculture 79.5790% 0.085995 0.073475 0.999998
Land locked dummy 69.9712% -0.246327 0.279980 0.000000
Life expectancy 65.0772% -0.043932 0.060608 0.003366
Industry 60.8500% 0.012035 0.021920 0.947514
Inflation 55.2649% 0.009621 0.053738 0.638752
Population 55.1043% 0.000001 0.000002 0.925026
Oil production 54.7382% -0.000001 0.000002 0.153486
PPP vol. 53.0949% 0.010005 0.057952 0.826610
Employment protection 50.9300% -0.001714 0.099356 0.259802
Mean no. regressors 15.83 Model Prior Random / 8
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior hyper (a=2.0066)
No. Obs. 301
Unconditional
GDP per capita volatility
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where the variables are not included (coefficients equal to zero). The best model 
according to PMP under this BMA specification includes all our variables. The 
second best omits only Employment protection and third best omits covariate 
Inflation. In our view this undermines the reliability of this specification. Our dataset 
might not fully explain the GDP volatility and therefore the model using all the 
information available (i.e. including all the explanatory variables resulting in highest 
R-squared) is favoured. The best models are shown in figure 5-4. All of the 1000 best 
models include Tax progressivity and report coefficient of this covariate with 
negative sign. 
Figure 5-4 : Inclusion Based on 1000 Best Models (Hyper g/Radnom) 
 
Results under the hyper g prior and uniform model prior are reported in table 5-8. 
The PIPs still remain higher than those of baseline model, but lower than in previous 
model specification, resulting in posterior model size close to 13 regressors.  
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Table 5-8: Results under Hyper g Prior and Uniform Model Prior 
 
Figure 5-7 summarizes the results of different model priors under hyper g prior. In 
addition to the above described random prior with prior model size 8 and uniform 
model prior, we report also random prior with prior model size set to 13, as suggested 
by mean number of regressors when using the uniform prior. This reports expected 
posterior model size equal to 17.5 so we also estimated random prior with model size 
set to 18 which, however, still reports higher posterior model size then prior model 
size, indicating that the results of random model prior under hyper g prior are 
somehow inconsistent. The last model prior included in figure 5-5 is the fixed prior 
with prior model size set to 13. 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9980% 0.030158 0.006217 1.000000
EU dummy 99.7057% 1.102934 0.295595 1.000000
Government Size 99.4889% -0.075280 0.021550 0.000000
Tax Progressivity 1 98.9076% -8.142296 2.492984 0.000000
Union Density 91.0493% 0.016568 0.008076 0.999580
Credit 88.2562% 0.004296 0.002394 0.999935
GDP per capita 81.5708% -0.000023 0.000016 0.000019
Urban 77.9102% -0.018977 0.014016 0.000066
Education 75.5103% -0.018293 0.014127 0.000000
Age dependency 71.9144% 0.038936 0.032872 0.999560
Terms of Trade vol. 71.0287% 0.080993 0.069681 0.995239
Agriculture 65.5802% 0.079432 0.077340 0.999989
Land locked dummy 51.0210% -0.226129 0.298191 0.000002
Mean no. regressors 12.95 Model Prior Uniform
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior hyper (a=2.0066)
No. Obs. 301
Unconditional
GDP per capita volatility
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Figure 5-5: Results Comparison under Different Model Priors (Hyper g) 
 
Despite our doubts about the results of random prior under hyper g prior, the results 
do not go against our hypothesis. Moreover the results of uniform and fixed prior are 
closer to those of the baseline specification and seem to be more reliable. Overall the 
hyper g prior confirms the four corner stone variables (Openness, Government size, 
EU dummy, Tax progressivity) as valid and ascribes them even higher PIPs, mostly 
indicating decisive evidence for an effect. Also the negative sign of the tax 
progressivity effect is confirmed. We do not rely on results using the hyper g prior, 
nevertheless important fact is the results do not contradict our previous findings when 
using the UIP prior. 
We do not report results under another popular parameter prior described in the 
methodology as BRIC prior. The reason is that with our data set of 20 explanatory 
variables and 301 observations this prior yields very similar results as the UIP prior. 
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5.4 Breaking down the volatility of GDP 
To shed some more light on the role of tax progressivity in GDP smoothening, we 
also regress our dataset on consumption volatility, investment volatility, government 
expenditures volatility, and volatility of hours worked. The results are shortly 
summarized in this section. For this analysis we only use the baseline specification of 
the model (i.e. g set to UIP together with uniform model prior), to reflect our limited 
knowledge about the true model and to keep the analysis simple. 
Consumption volatility 
Table 5-9 reports results
14
 when consumption volatility is used as the dependent 
variable. Mean number of regressors equals to 11.56 and the importance of individual 
covariates changed significantly. 
Table 5-9: Results with Consumption Volatility as the Dependent Variable 
 
                                                 
14
 From now on, only covariates with PIP>0.5 + tax progressivity measure are reported. 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Terms of Trade vol. 100.0000% 0.757217 0.118220 1.000000
GDP per capita 100.0000% -0.000171 0.000025 0.000000
Government Size 100.0000% -0.280819 0.038000 0.000000
Union Density 99.9991% 0.078242 0.015884 1.000000
Tax Progressivity 1 99.9990% -23.524397 4.459092 0.000000
Openness 99.9833% 0.048588 0.010895 1.000000
Employment protection 98.7055% -1.031399 0.293778 0.000000
Inflation 87.5127% 0.285310 0.178505 1.000000
Credit 79.0094% 0.009161 0.006090 1.000000
Industry 55.7040% -0.062272 0.065039 0.000001
Mean no. regressors 11.56 Model Prior Uniform
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Within our dataset the explanation of consumption volatility heavily relies on Terms 
of trade volatility, GDP per capita, Government size, Union density, Tax 
progressivity and Openness of the economy, as their PIPs indicate decisive evidence 
for an effect. Our short and simple explanation of those effects is following: terms of 
trade itself reflect the level of consumption as if imports grow or exports decrease, 
most probably more is consumed within the country, and vice versa. Therefore also 
the volatility of the terms of trade is linked to volatility of consumption. Citizens of 
countries with higher GDP per capita have generally higher income, which allows 
them to better smooth the consumption over the business cycle and whole life. This is 
well documented in the literature (see for example Heckman, 1974). Bigger 
government usually provides larger safety nets which insure its citizens against 
severe income drop and helps to smooth their consumption. Rumler and Scharler 
(2011) see the union density as proxy for wage bargaining power and argue that 
strong unions may be less prone to adverse moderation in case of an adverse shock 
and thus higher union density leads to more volatile business cycle. The volatile 
business cycle might translate into volatile disposable income which affects the 
consumption volatility. In our view, the case of openness is similar to the union 
density in the way that more open economies suffer from larger impacts of adverse 
shocks which then translates to the volatility of consumption. The role of tax 
progressivity on disposable income and consumption smoothening was already 
described in the literature review.  
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In terms of standardized coefficients, or magnitudes, reported in table 5-10, the tax 
progressivity ranks sixth among the variables
15
, and the size of the effect is 
comparable to the effect of tax progressivity on GDP volatility. 




We proceed with inspection of the effect of tax progressivity on Investment volatility 
as another component of GDP. Compared to Consumption volatility and Government 
expenditures volatility, Investment volatility exhibits lowest volatility over our 
dataset. The estimates are reported in table 5-11. The PIP of tax progressivity 
indicates lack of evidence for an effect and the coefficient is much smaller than in 
case of GDP or consumption volatility. If we check the standardized conditional 
coefficient, to account for the lower PIP, the estimated size of effect of tax 
                                                 
15
 Highest magnitude of an effect is ascribed to GDP per capita, followed by government size, terms of 
trade volatility, union density, and openness. 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD
Terms of Trade vol. 0.7572 0.1182 0.3899 0.0609 0.3899 0.0609
GDP per capita -0.0002 0.0000 -0.5766 0.0855 -0.5766 0.0855
Government Size -0.2808 0.0380 -0.4551 0.0616 -0.4551 0.0616
Union Density 0.0782 0.0159 0.3759 0.0763 0.3759 0.0763
Tax Progressivity 1 -23.5246 4.4585 -0.2275 0.0431 -0.2275 0.0431
Openness 0.0486 0.0109 0.3240 0.0727 0.3241 0.0725
Employment protection -1.0449 0.2707 -0.1774 0.0505 -0.1797 0.0466
Inflation 0.3260 0.1521 0.1790 0.1120 0.2045 0.0954
Credit 0.0116 0.0043 0.1387 0.0922 0.1755 0.0655
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progressivity on investment volatility is half of the size of the effect of tax 
progressivity on GDP volatility. 
Table 5-11: Results with Investments Volatility as the Dependent Variable 
 
The dataset is not tailor made for explaining the investment volatility, so the results 
are not fully reliable and for example the PIP of Tax progressivity could be even 
lower when including some other important variables determining the investment 
volatility. Having this in mind we do not find evidence for the stabilizing effect of tax 
progressivity on GDP volatility through stabilizing the level of investments. Our 
results of the effect of tax progressivity on Investments volatility are in contrast with 
results of Attinasi et al. (2011) and with findings of Moldovan (2010), who concludes 
that tax progressivity, via its impact on after tax income, stabilizes the level of 
consumption and investments, while the effect on hours worked is ambiguous. We 
report our estimates of BMA with volatility of hours worked as dependent variable 
bellow in this section. 
Dependent Variable:
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Credit 100.0000% -0.028448 0.004058 0.000000
Life expectancy 99.9991% -0.696508 0.156234 0.000000
GDP per capita 99.9983% 0.000134 0.000032 1.000000
EU dummy 99.9616% -2.574112 0.516734 0.000000
Oil production 99.8872% -0.000021 0.000005 0.000000
Employment protection 95.4704% -1.024971 0.378611 0.000000
Land locked dummy 83.9147% -1.452909 0.830084 0.000000
Urban 63.9082% 0.034502 0.030963 1.000000
Openness 63.5091% -0.021357 0.019224 0.000039
Tax Progressivity 1 44.8355% -4.927818 6.339588 0.000000
Mean no. regressors 9.69 Model Prior Uniform
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Government expenditures volatility 
 Due to lack of the data on government spending, the presented results are based on 
only 262 observations, missing the following countries: Canada, Iceland, Mexico, 
New Zealand, and Turkey. We found a decisive evidence for an effect of Openness, 
Credit and Government size, while the PIP of Tax progressivity is below 10% so we 
lack any evidence indicating the tax progressivity influences the volatility of 
government expenditures. Moreover, the posterior probability of positive sign of Tax 
progressivity is more than 82%, which means that if there was any effect of Tax 
progressivity on volatility of Government expenditure, it would be rather volatility 
enhancing than stabilizing. In our view, the presented results disqualify government 
expenditures from being the channel through which the tax progressivity stabilizes 
the output. 
Table 5-12: Results with Government Expenditures as the Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent Variable: Government expenditures vol.
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 99.9730% 0.054080 0.012956 1.000000
Credit 99.8672% 0.021252 0.005158 1.000000
Government Size 99.7157% -0.228207 0.059165 0.000000
Inflation 98.5042% -0.820340 0.270430 0.000000
Industry 97.0927% 0.185663 0.063696 1.000000
PPP vol. 77.4058% 0.753145 0.508281 1.000000
Urban 64.2155% -0.043940 0.040002 0.000000
Population 55.8048% -0.000008 0.000008 0.000026
Tax Progressivity 1 8.5719% 0.260019 2.160300 0.746633
Mean no. regressors 9.12 Model Prior Uniform
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior UIP
No. Obs. 262
Unconditional
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Volatility of Hours worked  
We close this chapter presenting estimates of BMA with volatility of hours worked as 
the dependent variable. Mattesini and Rossi (2012) identified hours worked as 
possible channel for the effect of tax progressivity on the output volatility. The 
coefficients of openness and  tax progressivity as the only two covariates with PIP 
over 50% are reported in table 5-13. 
Table 5-13: Results with Volatility of Hours Worked as the Dependent Variable 
 
The posterior model size is estimated to relatively low 3.3 which reflects the low PIPs 
of the rest of variables as no other than reported covariates from our dataset reported 
PIP higher than 13%. The best model with PMP of 23% includes only the covariates 
of openness and tax progressivity, and the results indicate strong evidence for an 
effect of these variables. The estimated effect of tax progressivity is negative in all 
models and thus volatility decreasing and the standardized coefficient of tax 
progressivity is similar to the one from baseline specification when regressed on GDP 
volatility.  The presented results justify the above presented idea that tax 
progressivity stabilizing effect works through marginal incentives presented by 
Christiano (1984), while they are in contrast with results of Attinasi et al. (2011), who 
Dependent Variable: Volatility of Hours worked
Variable Name PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Openness 95.8479% 0.008725 0.003078 1.000000
Tax Progressivity 1 95.7526% -5.433467 1.932840 0.000000
Mean no. regressors 3.37 Model Prior Uniform
No. models visited 1048576 g-Prior UIP
No. Obs. 301
Unconditional
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finds positive but insignificant effect of tax progressivity on volatility of hours 
worked. 
5.5 Different progressivity measures 
To check robustness of our results, we employ two other measures of tax 
progressivity, described in chapter 4. In table 5-14 we report the coefficients only for 
the tax progressivity covariates as we are not interested in robustness of other results.  
Table 5-14: Results Using Different Tax Progressivity Measures 
 
For the progressivity measure 2
16
 we find decisive evidence for an effect, while for 
the progressivity measure 3
17 
we find just positive evidence for the effect. Before 
further inspecting the results, the reader should realize that one measure is just an 
extension of the other. Particularly, Progressivity tax measure 3 does not average 
over PIT of single workers only, such as measure 2 does, but averages over another 4 
family types. Moreover, the PITs of the other family types are usually higher than for 
the single workers, and therefore the measure 3 is higher than measure 2 for most of 
the observations. While this fact together with lower PIP of Progressivity measure 
                                                 
16
 Average of PIT measures as defined by Attinasi et al. (2011) for single workers earning 
67%, 100%, and 167% of average wage, see chapter 4 for more. 
17
 Average of PIT measures as defined by Attinasi et al. (2011) for all the family groups for 
which OECD reports the average and marginal tax rate, except one earner with two child. See 
chapter 4 for more information. 
Dependent Variable:
Variable name Coefficient type PIP Post. Mean Post. SD Cond.Pos.Sign
Tax Progressivity 2 Unconditional 99.1920% -8.229816 2.163128 0.000000
Standardized Unconditional -0.279942 0.073580
Tax Progressivity 3 Unconditional 84.3574% -4.087582 2.314666 0.000000
Standardized Unconditional -0.161276 0.091326
No. models visited 1048576 Model Prior Uniform
No. Obs. 301 g-Prior UIP
GDP per capita volatility
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number 3 might partly explain the difference in unconditional posterior means, which 
is twice as high for measure 2 compared to measure 3, it fails to explain the 
difference between standardised conditional coefficients. These differences in the 
estimated coefficients, which can be hardly explained and mostly reflects the 
fundamental differences in the progressivity measures or the different priors used are 
the reasons why we avoid any deeper quantification of the effect of tax progressivity 
on the output volatility and we rather focus on the PIPs and evidence for the effect 
and on the direction of this effect, which both seems to be robust to our different 
progressivity measures.  
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6 Conclusion 
We have investigated the effect of tax progressivity on GDP volatility using dataset 
of 31 OECD countries covering years from 2000 to 2015. We opted for BMA 
estimation technique, which allows us to employ 20 explanatory variables possibly 
affecting the output volatility, and overcome the issue of model uncertainty. To 
provide further robustness checks, we also employ three different progressivity 
measures, including completely new measure based on the slope of average tax rate 
curve, and two alternative measures extending the PIT measure defined in Attinasi et 
al. (2011). In contrast with PIT, our measures better captures the tax progressivity for 
different income levels and family types and does not solely focus on the average 
productivity worker. 
Our results are broadly in line with the evidence provided by Attinasi et al. (2011) 
and Mattesini and Rossi (2012), and suggest that tax progressivity is an important 
determinant of GDP volatility. In fact, tax progressivity ranks among 4 most 
important determinants of GDP volatility within our dataset next to the well 
documented effects of openness of the economy (Rodrik, 1998), government size 
(Fatás and Mihov, 2001), and dummy for EU membership, which might be seen as 
another measure of economic openness. The effect is robust to different parameter 
and model priors as well as to different progressivity measures. 
More importantly, we found very strong evidence that the effect of tax progressivity 
on output volatility has negative sign, which confirms our hypothesis that progressive 
taxation reduces output volatility. So far, the progressivity of tax system was mainly 
determined by societal preferences for the income redistribution or by efficiency 
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considerations, but we confirm that the possible efficiency losses stemming from 
progressive taxation may be compensated by reduction of output volatility. 
This thesis also provides evidence that the progressive tax system reduces volatility 
of private consumption and volatility of hours worked identified as the main channels 
for the stabilizing effect of tax progressivity on GDP volatility. Having this said, we 
see the progressive tax as a good measure to mitigate the negative response of the 
economy to aggregate demand shocks and productivity shocks. On the other hand, we 
conclude that the effect does not work through stabilizing the level of investments 
and government expenditures.  
While our contribution is the newly proposed and employed tax progressivity 
measure and the BMA approach, which is used for the first time to study the role of 
tax progressivity in GDP smoothening, the future research should focus on extending 
the study beyond the OECD countries, inclusion of other control variables possibly 
affecting the output volatility, and if possible, employing also some global measure 
of tax progressivity. It would be also interesting to study the trade-off between 
efficiency losses and stability gains.  
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Appendix A Data description 
Table A-1: Data description 
 
Variable Description Source
GDP per capita vol.




Own computation based on average and marginal tax rates 
of net personal income tax OECD
Openness
Imports+Exports/2 measured as % share on total GDP
WB
Government size
Total tax reveunes measured as share % on GDP
OECD
EU dummy =1 for EU member states
Union density
The ratio of  wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners OECD
GDP per capita




Employment in Agriculture, % share of total employment
WB
Credit
Domestic credit provided by financial sector, % of GDP
WB
Land locked dummy =1 for countries with no direct access to the sea
Terms of trade vol.
The terms of trade effect equals capacity to import less 




people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical 
offices. % of total population
Education
Primary school enrollment, % of gross
WB
Age dependency
% of working-age population
WB
Inflation
Consumer price index (annual % growth)
WB
Industry
Employment in Industry, % share of total employment
WB
PPP vol.
GDP purchasing power parities :- Units of national currency 
per PPS (purchasing power standard), standard deviation of 
% changes AMECO
Life expectancy
Life expectancy at bitrh (years)
WB
Oil production
Crude oil production thousand, tonne of oil equivalent
OECD
Population Number of total population AMECO
Employment 
protection




Private final consumption expenditure at current prices per 
head of population, standard deviation of % changes
AMECO
Investment volatility
Gross fixed capital formation, total economy, constant 









Average annual hours actually worked per worker
OECD
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Table A-2: List of countries included in the dataset 
Australia France Luxembourg Slovenia 
Austria Germany Mexico Spain 
Belgium  Greece Netherlands Sweden 
Canada  Hungary New Zealand Switzerland 
Czech 
Republic Iceland Norway  Turkey 
Denmark  Ireland Poland 
United 
Kingdom 
Estonia Italy Portugal United States 
Finland Japan Slovakia   
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Appendix B Exogeneity verification 
To verify that tax progressivity enters our analysis exogeneously, we instrument the 
Tax progressivity 1 measure by its lagged values. In the standard IV estimation we 
also control for variables with PIP higher than 50% according to our baseline model. 
The results are estimated using software STATA and reported in the table below: 
Table B-1: IV estimation Results 
 
Here the variable Government size corresponds to the value in first year of given 
period as in section 5.2.  The results confirm the significant negative effect of Tax 
progressivity on output volatility, but more importantly, STATA also provides 
Durbin statistics and Wu-Hausmann statistics and corresponding p-values to evaluate 
the null hypothesis that variables are exogenous: 
Table B-2: Endogeneity Test 
 
Based on these results, we can not reject the exogeneity of Tax progressivity 1 in our 
analysis. 
 
Coefficient Std.err z P>|z|
Taxprogressivity1 -9.1373 2.3182 -3.94 0.000 -13.6808 -4.5938
Openess 0.0276 0.0033 8.36 0.000 0.0211 0.0341
Governmentsize -0.0988 0.0176 -5.62 0.000 -0.1332 -0.0644
EU 1.0599 0.2317 4.57 0.000 0.6057 1.5141
UD 0.0234 0.0054 4.32 0.000 0.0128 0.0340
GDPpc 0.0000 0.0000 -2.32 0.020 0.0000 0.0000
Agriculture 0.1305 0.0518 2.52 0.012 0.0290 0.2320
_cons 4.8621 0.6124 7.94 0.000 3.6617 6.0625
Dependent variable: GDP p. c. volatility
[95% Conf. Interval]
Instruments:   Openess Governmentsize EU UD GDPpc Agriculture Lagtax1
Instrumented:  Taxprogressivity1
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Durbin (score) chi(1) = 0.352825  (p = 0.5525)
  Wu-Hausman F(1,263) =  0.341593  (p = 0.5594)
